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The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and a diverse team of partners  were tasked by the 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC) to contribute to the conceptualization and 
development of their Rural Poverty and Environment (RPE) programme related to Compensation and 
Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) by providing an overview of relevant developments in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America, a global synthesis of results and recommendations. Truly global in 
nature, the CRES Scoping Study was undertaken by the following partners and collaborators based 
in 7 countries across 4 continents. 
 
 
The African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) is a Nairobi-based science, technology and 
environment policy Inter-governmental organization (IGO) that generates and disseminates new 
knowledge through policy analysis and outreach. The Centre’s mission is to strengthen the capacity of 
African countries and institutions to harness science and technology for sustainable development. 
ACTS strives to rationalize scientific and technological information to enable African countries make 
effective policy choices for improved living standards. ACTS works with partners and networks 
including academic and research institutions, national governments, UN bodies, regional and 
international processes and NGOs. ACTS' research and capacity building activities are organized in 
five programmatic areas: Biodiversity and Environmental Governance; Energy and Water Security; 
Agriculture and Food Security; Human Health; and Science and Technology Literacy. Its members are: 
Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Uganda and Ghana, The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) and the Third 




Corporación Grupo Randi Randi (CGRR) is a non-profit corporation, whose mission is to build and 
motivate equitable development and a healthy environment, stimulating the imagination, creativity and 
the talent of our collaborators, incorporating gender, generation and ethnic equality, local participation, 
the sustainable management of natural resources and the conservation of biodiversity. CGRR was 
legalized in Ecuador in 2000, currently has 17 members, and operates a range of research and 
development projects, with international and national funding, ranging from participatory watershed 
management, watershed inventories and modeling, gender and environment, community conservation, 
conservation planning for protected areas and integrated crop management for sustainable 
development. CGRR is a member of the Consorcio para el Desarrollo Sostenible en los Andes 
(CONDESAN),  the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the Ecuadorian 
association of environmental NGOs, (CEDENMA), and is a founding member of RISAS, a national 




Forest Trends is an international non-profit organization that works to expand the value of forests to 
society; to promote sustainable forest management and conservation by creating and capturing market 
values for ecosystem services; to support innovative projects and companies that are developing these 
new markets; and to enhance the livelihoods of local communities living in and around those forests. 
We analyze strategic market and policy issues, catalyze connections between forward-looking 
producers, communities and investors, and develop new financial tools to help markets work for 











                                   





The Institute for Social and Economic Change (ISEC) is an all India Institute for Interdisciplinary 
Research and Training in the Social Sciences, established in 1972 by the late Professor VKRV Rao. It 
is registered as a Society under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, to create a blend of 
field-oriented empirical research and advances in social science theories leading to better public policy 
formulation. Its mission is to conduct interdisciplinary research in analytical and applied areas of social 
sciences, encompassing diverse aspects of development; to assist both central and state governments by 
undertaking systematic studies of resource potential, identifying factors influencing growth and 
examining measures for reducing poverty; and to establish fruitful contacts with other institutions and 
scholars engaged in social science research through collaborative research programmes and seminars, 





The World Conservation Union  (IUCN): Founded in 1948, IUCN brings together States, 
Government agencies and a diverse range of NGOs in a unique partnership with over 1000 members 
spread across some 150 countries. As a Union IUCN seeks to influence, encourage and assist societies 
throughout the world to conserve the integrity and diversity of nature and to ensure that any use of 




The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is the voice for the environment in the 
United Nations system. It is an advocate, educator, catalyst and facilitator, promoting the wise use of 
the planet's natural assets for sustainable development. UNEP's mission is "to provide leadership and 
encourage partnership in caring for the environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and 




The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) is the international leader in the science and practice of 
integrating ‘working trees’ on small farms and in rural landscapes. We have invigorated the ancient 
practice of growing trees on farms, using innovative science for development to transform lives and 
landscapes. The World Agroforestry Centre is one of the 15 centres supported by the Consultative 
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Abstract  
This paper is the 9th paper in a series of nine interlinked papers commissioned by the Rural Poverty 
and Environment Programme (RPE) of the International Development Research Center (IDRC) as part 
of a research project entitled ‘Scoping Study of Compensation for Ecosystem Services’. The purpose of 
this project is to provide the RPE with a broader and richer deliberation on the potential for economic 
instruments (including market, financial and incentive based instruments) which conserve ecosystem 
services and at the same time contribute to poverty reduction in the developing world. 
The development of Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES) will have 
differential impact on poor resource managers and poor consumers depending upon the characteristics 
of the resource itself, the financial and other values for different beneficiaries, and the design of 
payment and market systems. In this early stage of CRES development, there are significant 
opportunities to shape that development in ways that will have greater benefits for the poor and for 
poverty reduction. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relative importance of different types of 
CRES in shaping poverty and ecosystem services across the developing world, as they are likely to 





Environmental services, payment for environmental services, compensation and rewards for 
environmental services, ecosystem services, watershed services, carbon sequestration and storage, 
economic demand for ecosystem services 
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Preface 
From the beginning of 2006 until March 2007, the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF) led a 
consortium of organizations and individuals from around the world in a pan-tropical scoping study of 
Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services (CRES).  The scoping study was 
commissioned by the Rural Poverty and Environment Programme of the International Development 
Research Centre of Canada (IDRC) to identify critical issues affecting the development, operation, 
impacts and institutionalization of mechanisms linking beneficiaries of ecosystem services with 
stewards of those ecosystems. Particular attention is paid to the potential for CRES to alleviate or 
exacerbate the multiple dimensions of poverty: rights to productive assets, streams of income and 
consumption, and vulnerability to shocks.   
  
The scoping study included a series of regional workshops held in Latin America (Quito, Ecuador), 
Asia (Bangalore, India) and Africa (Nairobi, Kenya). Participants presented and discussed practical 
CRES experiences from across the developing world, experiences which informed and challenged the 
development of several cross-cutting issue papers. A series of nine working papers have been prepared 
to summarize the results of the scoping study, including an introductory paper, three regional workshop 
reports, and five issue papers on key topics.   
 
ICRAF Working paper 32 – Compensation and Rewards for Environmental Services in the Developing 
World: Framing Pan-Tropical Analysis and Comparison. 
ICRAF Working paper 33 – Report on the Latin American Regional Workshop on Compensation for 
Environmental Services and Poverty Alleviation in Latin America. 
ICRAF Working paper 34 – Asia Regional Workshop on Compensation for Ecosystems Services. A 
component of the global scoping study on compensation for ecosystem services. 
ICRAF Working paper 35 – African Regional Workshop on Compensation for Ecosystem Services (CES).  
ICRAF Working paper 36 – Exploring the inter-linkages among and between Compensation and Rewards 
for Ecosystem Services (CRES) and human well-being: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 1.  
ICRAF Working paper 37 – Criteria and indicators for environmental service compensation and reward 
mechanisms: realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 2. 
ICRAF Working paper 38 – The conditions for effective mechanisms of Compensation and Reward for 
Environmental Services (CRES): CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 3. 
ICRAF Working paper 39 – Organization and governance for fostering pro-poor Compensation for 
Environmental Services: CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 4. 
ICRAF Working paper 40 – How important will different types of Compensation and Reward 
Mechanisms be in shaping poverty & ecosystem services across Africa, Asia & Latin America over the 
next two decades? CES Scoping Study Issue Paper no. 5. 
 
The working papers are designed for relatively limited circulation of preliminary material.  We 
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Compensation and rewards for ecosystem services (CRES) is a relatively new approach 
for achieving resource conservation and restoration, through contingent contracts – in 
many different forms – between ecosystem stewards and beneficiaries of ecosystem 
services. CRES systems are being encouraged and shaped by several global trends, 
including increased demand for ecosystem services, the search for new sources of 
conservation finance, growing business interest in environmental quality; and supportive 
changes in resource governance at local, national and international levels. 
 
Increased economic demand for ecosystem services. Increased human populations 
and economic activity have simultaneously reduced the ability of ecosystems to provide 
key services and increased the demand for and financial value of ecosystem services. 
Most population estimates project global population will grow by 2 billion over the next 
30 years and another 1 billion in the subsequent 20 years – and virtually all of this growth 
will take place in developing countries. The global commercial demand for food is 
projected to double over the next few decades, and will triple or more in many low-
income developing countries (McNeely and Scherr 2003). Water demand is expected to 
either double or triple current use over the next 50 years. Irrigation for food is the single 
largest use of water, and competition over water between food production and 
environmental values are likely to increase.  
 
Meanwhile, urbanization is shifting the organization of rural lands to produce food and 
fuel for the cities, and converting habitats to human settlements. Climate change is 
shifting wild plant and animal habitats, calling into question the long-term value of 
conventional public protected areas. Biomass, solar, wind and other energy sources are 
increasing as conventional energy costs rise, altering the economic incentives for land 
use. 
 
Continued growth of the global and major national economies in the developing world 
(like China and India) is likely to increase the financial/business value of ecosystem 
services in ecosystem-dependent industries from water utilities to tourism, and human 
settlements (Mulder et al. 2006). Recognition by businesses and policymakers of the 
financial contribution that healthy ecosystems make to society, and fear of the effects of 
ecosystem degradation, are increasing effective economic demand for ecosystem services.  
 
Search for new sources of conservation finance. Current levels of government 
conservation finance are grossly inadequate and unlikely to increase enough to conserve 
critical resources, due to competition for tax revenues. The finance going to 
conservation, as seen by various indicators, continues to decline, leading to an increased 
need for private sector conservation financing. For example, the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and PROFOR suggest that 
US$31-US$70 billion is required annually just to finance sustainable forest management, 
resources available from Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Donor countries, 
funding to forestry reached an all time low in 2004, representing only 0.3% of all ODA
1 
from past averages of 0.6% to 1.2% since 1990. Overall conservation financing from 
                                                 
1 OECD CRS Database figures. 
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private philanthropy has consistently declined since 1998,
2 and the conservation 
community estimates a gap of US$27-30 billion annually in financing required for the 
management and expansion of existing public protected areas (Molnar et al. 2005). With 
global economic and population growth placing unprecedented pressures on the 
underlying natural resource ‘infrastructure,’ it seems likely that many key resources will 
only be conserved if the costs of conservation management are adequately financed, and 
returns to conservation management are economically competitive with alternative 
resource-degrading activities. 
 
Corporate interest in environmental investments. National and international 
corporations in some sectors have begun to invest in environmental assets, generally for 
one of three reasons: they are forced to by regulation or the pending threat of regulation 
in the (near) future; for philanthropic reasons, to enhance their reputation; or because 
payments deliver a return on their investment (Mulder et al. 2006). To maintain their 
‘license to operate’ in many countries, natural resource-using businesses must 
demonstrate ‘corporate social responsibility’ by reducing or cleaning up environmental 
damage, or demonstrating sustainable source. In more recent years, some industries have 
recognized the ‘business case’ for sustainable ecosystem management, in order to take 
advantage of new business opportunities, secure or sustain critical resource flows, 
enhance financial value of natural assets belonging to the company, or enabling green 
‘branding’ of products.  
 
A recent study by Mulder et al. (2006), recorded 100 types and more than 1,100 
transactions of private PES
3 with a distribution across ecosystem services (Waage 2007). 
The majority of these initiatives take place in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially 
in the markets for water-related services, biodiversity, carbon and the scenic beauty of 
the landscape. Payments for biodiversity mostly take place in the U.S., due to the 
conservation banking market and wetland mitigation banking market. Europe and Africa 
do not play major roles in any of the markets.  
 
It is noteworthy that most of the private sector entities engaged with markets and 
payments for ecosystem services have at least some sort of ‘business benefit’ associated 
with paying for an ecosystem service. The role of intangibles, such as brand value, is 
being more closely assessed in terms of climate change. For example, one study found 
that both airlines as well as food and beverage companies have 50% and 10%, 
respectively, of intangible market value at risk due to climate change. Investments in 
ecosystem service markets may play a role in contributing positively to a firm’s public 
image. A number of companies will realize specific financial gains, such as the newly 
created Australian company New Forests Pty. and the British company ForestRe. In 
addition, a clear business case exists for two water companies in Costa Rica, namely 
Matamoros Empresa Eléctrica Platanar (MEEP) and Empresa Servicios Públicos de 
                                                 
2 The Foundation Center. 2005. Foundation Giving Trends: Update on Funding Priorities, 2005. These 
data track the donations and grants of 97% of U.S. philanthropic organizations (which accounts for 90% 
of the world’s total). While only grants exceeding US$10,000 are tracked, these represent little more than 
half of total estimated grant dollars awarded by US foundations 
3 The distinction between the two can be explained by the following example. Both wetland mitigation 
banking (“water”) as well as conservation banking (“biodiversity”) in the US account for a considerable 
market. As an initiative in itself, they represent a single case. However, the number of individual 
transactions that take place within the market is far larger; wetland mitigation banking (water market) 
accounts for about 47 transactions and conservation banking (biodiversity market) about 930. 
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Heredia (ESPH), which are paying forest dwellers living in upstream watersheds for 
maintaining the forests at those places in order to secure continuous water availability.  
 
Supportive changes in resource governance. Important changes in the governance of 
land and natural resources are enabling the emergence of new contractual agreements 
between beneficiaries and providers of ecosystem services, including low-income 
communities. At the local and national levels, the trend is toward decentralization, 
including the transfer of land and resource tenure to local people (White and Martin 
2002; Molnar et al. 2005). This control provides land stewards and communities the 
opportunity to enter into contracts such as CRES. At the international level, instruments 
of the Multilateral Environmental Agreements are being shaped to mobilize CRES (see 
section 3).  
 
Objective and organization of the paper. The development of CRES will have 
differential impact on poor resource managers and poor consumers depending upon 
characteristics of the resource itself, the financial and other values for different 
beneficiaries, and the design of payment and market systems. In this early stage of CRES 
development, there are significant opportunities to shape that development in ways that 
will have greater benefits for the poor and for poverty reduction. This paper will explore 
the relative importance of different types of CRES in shaping poverty and ecosystem 
services across the developing world, as they are likely to evolve over the next two 
decades.  
 
The next section of the paper will review the current size, status, and characteristics of 
different types of CRES. Section 3 will describe the economic and policy processes 
currently shaping CRES markets and possible points of intervention to develop these 
markets in ways that are pro-poor. Section 4 draws on the previous sections to analyze 
the potential of each CRES market sector to provide income opportunities for poor rural 
communities while protecting the ecosystem services critical to their livelihoods. The 
final section will identify key research questions that need to be answered in order to 
realize that goal. The paper draws from a number of sources including business analyses, 
case studies, academic literature and expert consultation. A key resource was the 
Ecosystem Service Market Matrix developed by The Katoomba Group’s Ecosystem 
Marketplace (2006).  
 
 
2. Current Status and Characteristics of CRES in Developing 
Countries  
This paper defines a typology of CRES markets based on two key variables – the 
ecosystem services being transacted and the identity of the service buyers. This typology 
is used to identify and analyze the current state and characteristics of different CRES 
market segments.  
 
2.1 Evaluating Markets Segments for CRES 
 
Previous analyses have identified four principal ecosystem services amenable to market 
transaction: biodiversity conservation, landscape beauty and recreation, carbon 
sequestration and storage, and watershed protection (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). 
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Our typology for watershed protection distinguishes between the protection of water 
quality and the regulatory of water flow (including flood control). Thus, in total, five 
services are analyzed.  
 
We identify five basic types of ecosystem service buyers:  
1)  Public sector buyers, including local, regional, and national governments as well 
as quasi-public international buyers such as the World Bank and similar 
multilateral agencies. These buyers typically seek to protect ecosystem services as 
public goods, on behalf of their constituencies.  
2)  Private sector buyers who are under regulatory obligation to offset environmental 
impacts and may do so by purchasing ecosystem service credits. Such buyers are 
often regulated by ‘cap-and-trade’ frameworks such as the Kyoto Protocol or ‘no 
net loss’ policies for habitat or wetlands.  
3)  Private businesses or organizations who seek to secure ecosystem services for 
their use values or for other business benefits. Included within this category are 
buyers who seek to protect the environment to maintain their reputation or 
‘social license to operate,’ or to gain a marketing advantage by creating a green 
image.  
4)  Philanthropic buyers, such as conservation organizations and charitable 
individuals, who are motivated by non-use values of ecosystem services. This 
category includes companies and individuals who offset their carbon emissions 
without any regulatory requirement to do so, and contributors to non-
governmental conservation organizations. 
5)  Consumers of eco-certified products who seek to purchase goods produced in 
ways consistent with their environmental values – for example, buyers of 
‘rainforest-friendly’ coffee or forest products certified to be grown from 
sustainable sources.  
 
2.2 CRES for Biodiversity Services 
 
Financial payments for biodiversity protection services are presently estimated to be the 
largest for ecosystem services associated with land use and land use change, if 
conservation easements are included (see Annex -Table 1). Payments are made for a 
variety of stewardship services. One is payment for access to habitat and species; this includes 
bioprospecting rights (rights to collect, test and use genetic material from a designated 
area); research permits (right to collect specimens, take measurements in area); and 
hunting, fishing or gathering permits for wild species. A second is payment for biodiversity-
conserving management of habitats. These include conservation easements (owner paid to use 
and manage defined piece of land only for conservation purposes; restrictions are usually 
in perpetuity and transferable upon sale of the land); conservation land lease (owner paid 
to use and manage defined piece of land for conservation purposes, for defined period of 
time); conservation concession (owners or stewards on public lands are paid to maintain 
a defined area under conservation uses only; comparable to a forest logging concession); 
community concession in public protected areas (individuals or communities are 
allocated use rights to a defined area of forest or grassland, in return for commitment to 
protect the area from practices that harm biodiversity); and management contracts for 
habitat or species conservation on private farms, forests, grazing lands (contract that 
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details biodiversity management activities, and payments linked to the achievement of 
specified objectives). A third is payment for continued or increased presence of particular species 
(e.g., breeding pairs of endangered species found on private lands). 
 
Public sector payments. Public and quasi-public agencies are currently the largest 
buyers of biodiversity conservation services, with payments totaling at least US$3 billion
4 
annually. The largest public biodiversity payment for environmental services (PES) 
programs are the agri-environment payment programs in the United States and Europe, 
which compensate farmers for providing a variety of conservation-friendly land-use and 
management practices. Roughly 20% of the farmland in the European Union is under 
some form of agri-environment program to reduce the negative impacts of modern 
agriculture on the environment, at a cost of about US$1.5 billion (although much of this 
land is managed for other ecosystem services, not specifically for biodiversity 
conservation). In the United States, seven programs authorized under the 2002 Farm Bill 
encourage the provision of fish and wildlife habitat on private lands through payments 
for habitat protection and restoration, or for the presence of wildlife on farms. In 2005, 
these payments totaled over US$4.5 billion. Mexico’s public watershed payment program 
has now incorporated biodiversity benefits (CONAFOR 2005), while Costa Rica’s 
national CRES program compensates landowners for the conservation and restoration of 
forests. 
 
Public sector buyers include international organizations such as the World Bank and 
Global Environmental Facility and national governments that enact conservation 
payment schemes. The World Bank’s BioCarbon fund is one of the largest biodiversity 
CRES programs from quasi-public international organizations, mobilizing US$54 million 
in its first two years of operation (2004-06). This program aims to sequester carbon while 
promoting biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation co-benefits. 
 
  Regulation-driven private payments (cap-and-trade systems). Cap-and-trade 
systems for biodiversity conservation take three basic forms: tradable wetland mitigation 
credits (credits from wetland conservation or restoration that can be used to offset 
obligations of developers to maintain a minimum area of natural wetlands in a defined 
region); tradable development rights (rights allocated to develop only a limited total area 
of natural habitat within a defined region); and tradable biodiversity credits (credits 
representing areas of biodiversity protection or enhancement, that can be purchased by 
developers to ensure they meet a minimum standard of biodiversity protection). 
 
  To date, regulation-driven biodiversity CRES have been limited to developed countries, 
namely the United States, Australia and France. In the United States, for example, at least 
US$45 million is spent annually on regulatory offsets for biodiversity, including 
conservation banking; wetland mitigation banking and tradable development rights may 
also include biodiversity conservation as one of their objectives. Recent legislation in 
Australia also allows private landholders who conserve biodiversity values on their land 
to sell the resulting ‘credits’ to a common pool. The law also creates obligations for land 
developers and others to purchase those credits (Brand 2002). Several middle-income 
countries are in the process of developing other cap-and-trade systems for wetland and 
conservation banking. 
 
                                                 
4 All currency figures are provided in U.S. dollar equivalent. 
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Voluntary private sector payments. Private companies may voluntarily purchase 
biodiversity conservation services to demonstrate corporate environmental responsibility 
or to secure use values from biodiversity. A 2002 study of 72 payments for forest 
biodiversity protection services found that private corporations were the buyers in the 
largest number of cases (Pagiola et al. 2002), although the total volume of these markets 
remains small. While biodiversity payments from private companies for business reasons 
are still nascent markets, examples of such markets exist. For instance, ‘bioprospecting’ 
arrangements, in which pharmaceutical companies purchase rights to use chemical 
compounds and genetic resources, are a US$30 million-a-year market. One promising 
market sector is voluntary private biodiversity offsets: conservation activities intended to 
compensate for the residual, unavoidable harm to biodiversity caused by development 
projects (Ten Kate et al. 2004). To date, at least US$ 20 million in voluntary private 
biodiversity offsets have been documented, half in developing countries (Ecosystem 
Marketplace 2006). 
 
Philanthropic payments. Philanthropic buyers of biodiversity conservation services 
include non-profit conservation organizations, research institutes, foundations, and 
private individuals who are motivated by protecting non-use values of biodiversity. 
Conservation organization, such as Conservation International and The Nature 
Conservancy internationally, and many national NGOs and trusts reward or compensate 
private landowners for conservation use of their lands. Such projects may involve 
agreements with low-income landowners and managers to carry out habitat and wildlife 
conservation in exchange for monetary or non-monetary compensation. A McKinsey-
World Resources Institute-The Nature Conservancy report estimated the value of annual 
international finance for conservation (protecting land from development) in developing 
countries at US$2 billion, with the forest conservation component a large share of that. 
Buyers are predominantly development banks and foundations in the U.S. and Europe.  
 
Eco-certified products. Eco-certified products are a large and rapidly growing market: 
as of 2006, this market was valued at US$26 billion worldwide with a growth rate of 30% 
annually (Ecosystem Marketplace 2006). The value of certified timber and non-timber 
forest products is estimated at a current value of US$5 billion and is estimated by the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) to top US$15 billion in the next decade (FSC estimate, 
2005 from Ecosystem Marketplace). Pressures continue to increase on major 
international trading and food processing companies to source from suppliers who are 
not degrading ecosystem services (Clay 2002). Demand for organic farm products is 
increasing at 20% per year, and the international organic movement is strengthening 
standards for biodiversity conservation (IFOAM 2002). Rainforest Alliance has initiated a 
labeling program with explicit biodiversity criteria, and are looking to assess impacts at a 
landscape scale (www.rainforestalliance.org). Of course, most of value of eco-certified 
products is for the products themselves, with a relatively small and unspecific premium 
paid by the consumer for the eco-friendly production practices, including biodiversity 
conservation. Although consumers purchase eco-certified products for a host of reasons 
(including health, social justice, and environmental concerns), biodiversity conservation is 
the ecosystem service most closely associated with consumer preference for certified 
products.  
 
A new, but evolving segment of this market is the labeling of products from widely-
appreciated unique habitats, such as particular national parks or natural features (e.g., 
Chesapeake Bay-friendly chicken in the US) or ecozones (South African Cape wines). 
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Producers whose production systems are certified to be managed in ways that conserve 
those special habitats are allowed to use the labels. 
 
2.3 CRES for Landscape Beauty and Recreation  
 
This category encompasses a variety of services including the conservation of wildlife for 
consumptive use (hunting) or non-consumptive use (viewing) and the protection of 
landscape beauty. Although these services often overlap with biodiversity services, the 
commodity being purchased by tourists is an access right to scenic beauty or wild species, 
not biodiversity per se. Most CRES are direct public or private sector payments, with 
scattered projects supported by philanthropic foundations or trusts.  
 
Public sector payments. Payments to land stewards by enterprises that cater to tourists 
are typically negotiated on a case-by-case basis. In a review of landscape beauty 
payments, the most frequent market-based mechanisms used to attach value to these 
services were: access rights/entrance payments such as visitor fees (50%), package 
tourism deals (25%) and management arrangements or projects (25%) (Landell-Mills and 
Porras 2002). Many of the local arrangements for wildlife protection with local 
communities in Africa have been set up as a form of CRES (Bond 2005). In some 
national parks, however, payments are neither voluntary nor conditional: local 
communities are required to curtail their activities in the park, but as compensation they 
receive a portion of park revenues. In the United States, public hunting and fishing 
permits are worth tens of millions of dollars. Some European countries (e.g., 
Switzerland) make very large payments to farmers for maintaining pastoral landscapes 
that attract international tourists.  
 
Private sector payments. Increasing financial values for landscape beauty and 
recreation have stimulated significant private sector investment, by many small-to-
medium-sized actors. In the United States, many farms, ranchers and other rural 
landowners supplement their incomes through private access fees for recreational fishing 
and hunting on their land, and manage their resources to attract fish and game. Some 
farmers are also tapping into new ‘agro-eco-tourism’ markets in which biodiversity-
friendly farming practices, on-farm conservation of wild habitats and wildlife attract 
tourists to stay overnight at farmsteads. There are also new markets arising for real estate 
of high ecological value that will attract high-income buyers for person or commercial 
use, as in cases in Costa Rica, Chile and California (Scherr et al. 2007). These markets 
provide a financial incentive for landowners to invest in ecosystem restoration or 
conservation.  
 
There are no global estimates of scale of CRES for landscape beauty and recreation. The 
Ecosystem Marketplace estimates that US$1 billion is spent annually on ecologically-
responsible tourism (a small share of the huge total market of ‘nature tourism’ – 20% of 
all tourism – that relies for its value on natural resource assets).  
 
2.4 CRES for Watershed Services 
Payments for watershed protection services can be grouped into two categories: water 
quality and water flow regulation (including flood control). These categories, while 
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linked, often have different beneficiaries and are furthered by different land use practices; 
thus, they are commonly the focus of separate markets.  
 
Before enumerating each segment of the watershed service market, it is helpful to 
explore how the scale of watershed function influences demand for watershed services. 
Specifically, watershed protection services tend to be of interest mainly to local and 
regional users – in contrast with carbon sequestration and many biodiversity 
conservation services, which benefit the global community (Landell-Mills and Porras 
2002). This characteristic is both an asset and a liability for developing watershed CRES. 
On the positive side, it is relatively easy to identify the users or beneficiaries of watershed 
services, and many promising categories of buyers exist, including municipal water 
suppliers, hydroelectric facilities, industrial users, and irrigation systems. Furthermore, the 
critical day-to-day use value of these services for the beneficiaries may make revenue 
streams less subject to market fluctuations than CRES mechanisms driven by 
philanthropy, goodwill, public relations, or long-term global environmental well-being. A 
major downside of the local orientation of watershed service benefits is that there is little 
scope for attracting payments from the international community for either the use values 
or the non-use values of watershed services. Thus, there is currently little or no market 
for watershed services purchased by philanthropic buyers or demanded by individual 
consumers through their purchase of eco-certified products. 
 
Public sector payments. As shown in Annex (Table 2) public payments for watershed 
protection currently represent the largest market for watershed services, at up to US$2 
billion annually worldwide. These payments are driven by governments’ recognition of 
watershed services as being a critical public good for human subsistence, health and 
safety, agriculture, and economic development. Monetarily, public watershed payments 
have been concentrated in the United States and China, but numerous smaller public 
watershed CRES programs have been established in Latin America, Africa, and Asia 
(Katoomba Group 2006).  
 
A major driver of CRES innovation is that investments in sustainable watershed 
management are often substantially cheaper than investments in new water supply and 
treatment facilities. By investing approximately US$1 billion in land protection and 
conservation practices, New York City has avoided spending US$4-6 billion on filtration 
and treatment plants (Echavarria and Lochman 1999). Other cities in the United States - 
Portland, Oregon; Portland, Maine; and Seattle, Washington - have found that every 
US$1 invested in watershed protection can save anywhere from US$7.50 to nearly 
US$200 in costs for new filtration and water treatment facilities (Trust for Public Lands 
1997). In South Africa removing thirsty alien tree species in Cape Town’s watershed and 
restoring native vegetation produces water at a fraction of the cost of water delivered 
through diversion or reservoir projects (Gelderblom and van Wilgen 2000). Many of 
these programs have been designed specifically for co-benefits to local communities, and 
some (e.g., Mexico, South Africa) specifically to benefit poor groups within those 
communities. 
 
The local orientation of watershed service benefits means that, in the long term, 
developing country watershed CRES must be funded primarily by developing country 
water users. Whether this is feasible may depend on the context. The largest of the public 
watershed CRES schemes in developing countries – those in China, Mexico, and Costa 
Rica – are significantly funded by internal sources, although Costa Rica’s program also 
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relies on external subsidies (Chomitz et al. 1998; Alix-Garcia et al. 2005). On the other 
hand, the development of local watershed CRES programs in developing countries (i.e., 
programs where costs are borne locally and not distributed across an entire province or 
nation) may be difficult where the water users themselves are poor and unable to afford 
payments to upstream stewards. For example, funds collected from household water 
users in the Ecuadorian town of San Pedro de Pimampiro were able to cover only a 
fraction of the payments made to the upstream community; outside funds were needed 
to subsidize the payments as well as the substantial costs of monitoring and 
administration (Echavarria et al. 2004).  
 
Payments for watershed management for flood and disaster prevention and mitigation 
are still mostly at the conceptual stage, although proposals are on the table in Mexico, for 
example. In most models, payments are made by government agencies, but sometimes 
with financing through levies on landowners within the watershed. Large private 
insurance and re-insurance companies, such as Swiss-Re, have demonstrated interest in 
promoting such schemes. 
 
Regulation-driven cap-and-trade systems. Markets for watershed services driven by 
government regulation are currently operating in only a few countries, but the size of 
these markets is already relatively large – US$1 billion or more (Ecosystem Marketplace 
Matrix 2006). For example, wetland mitigation banking in the United States (in this case, 
to protect hydrological role of wetlands in flood control and dry season water availability) 
and salinity trading (for water quality) in Australia both use a ‘cap-and-trade’ framework 
to encourage or require landowners and developers to trade credits for specific watershed 
service. Not surprisingly, regulation-driven markets for watershed services concentrate in 
developed countries, reflecting the generally weaker state of environmental regulation in 
developing countries as well as the significant administrative, legal, and enforcement 
infrastructure needed to develop cap-and-trade type markets. Going forward, there is 
substantial potential for new and expanded cap-and-trade watershed service markets, 
principally for water quality. These are likely to concentrate in developed countries for 
the same reasons they have historically done so. However, emergence in developing and 
middle-income countries is also possible; for example, Colombia has already 
implemented a water quality trading program and South Africa has begun to design such 
a system (Ecosystem Marketplace Matrix 2006). To date, these systems have rarely 
incorporate pro-poor elements into their design. 
 
There are large private markets for water quantity trading among large water users in 
countries such as the United States, Australia, Chile, and Mexico, but these are actually 
markets for ecosystem goods (water), not services of watershed protection, and thus not 
discussed in this paper.  
 
Private payments. Compared to public payment schemes, private voluntary watershed 
CRES consist mainly of small, localized markets totaling about US$5 million annually, 
worldwide (Ecosystem Marketplace Matrix 2006). Most payments have been by water or 
other beverage bottling companies for whom water quality is a key attribute, by farmers 
dependent on flow of irrigation water, or by utilities and industries dependent upon a 
regular supply of water for manufacturing processes. These have typically not focused 
explicitly on pro-poor arrangements, but where poor communities are the main 
watershed stewards, they have been recipients of the payments (sometimes in form of 
community funds, etc.). 
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One challenge hindering the development of watershed service markets is the difficulty 
of translating user benefit and ‘theoretical’ willingness to pay into actual revenue streams. 
Even when private users recognize the value they derive from watershed services, they 
may be unwilling to pay for these services unless they perceive a threat to continued 
service delivery that is both immediate and likely to be mitigated as a result of their 
payment. Since land stewards are rarely able to exclude beneficiaries from using the 
watershed services that flow from their land, private users have a strong incentive to 
become ‘free riders’ and land stewards have little leverage to command payments. 
However, given the extensive reliance of private agricultural and industrial water users on 
watershed services, private voluntary CRES markets have the potential to proliferate if 
land stewards and buyers can overcome these challenges through collective action. 
Current efforts are underway to do exactly this (Bond 2005).  
2.5 CRES for Carbon Sequestration and Storage  
Public knowledge of the risks of climate change has led to pressure on governments and 
society to engage in activities to reduce carbon emissions. Projects called Land Use, Land 
Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), and recently changed to integrate Agriculture with 
Forestry and Other Land Uses (AFOLU), are the class that is discussed in this paper, 
relevant to poor land owners who may potentially participate in the market. Apart from 
activities of reforestation and afforestation, we also include information on soil carbon 
sequestration, agricultural activities, and avoided deforestation. Biofuels and methane 
management are other areas where the carbon market impacts land based communities 
but these sectors are not covered in depth here. 
 
The carbon market for landowners in developing countries operates according to three 
main mechanisms: i) carbon emissions offsets for the regulatory market, as established by 
the Kyoto Protocol (mainly public sector and private companies as buyers), ii) eligible 
offset activities in emerging regulatory markets in the U.S. and Australia operating 
outside the Kyoto Protocol (mainly for public sector, private buyers) and iii) the sale of 
voluntary carbon offsets coming from LULUCF projects and activities, (which is where 
individual consumers, philanthropic buyers, and private sector buyers are mainly found). 
Mechanisms which do not allow trade in land-based project credits, such as the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme are not covered in this section. 
 
Regulatory carbon market. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a project 
based transaction system that trades in CO2 removal activities, including afforestation 
and reforestation, to provide carbon offsets in this market segment. Once projects are 
registered and approved, a Certificate of Emissions Reduction (CER) is the instrument 
created that can be traded. The Kyoto Protocol authorizes only afforestation and 
reforestation activities, excluding soil carbon storage, sustainable forest management, and 
avoided deforestation. Agricultural management and avoidance of forest degradation are 
two other land-use sectors that are currently excluded from the CDM. 
 
The atmospheric benefits from CDM projects result in tradable permits that can be sold 
as carbon credits, helping Annex 1 countries
5 satisfy their emission reduction 
commitments (although only 1% of the 5.4% they are required to reduce can come from 
CDM credits). Buyers are thus Annex 1 signatories to the protocol, as well as private 
                                                 
5 Annex 1 countries: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php 
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companies from developed countries (operating mainly through public-private funds). If 
the full magnitude of 1% was purchased through the CDM, US$300 million value of 
trades in offset projects is estimated. The reality is that only US$100 million
6 has been 
transacted due to current limitations of the Mechanism. Sellers are project developers 
from developing countries that comply with the rigorous verification and registration 
processes established by the CDM (see Annex , Table 3). 
 
A class of temporary certified emissions reductions credits was created for LULUCF 
carbon credits due to concerns over ‘permanence’. Special accounting of emission 
removals, baselines, additionality and leakage were also defined for LULUCF projects by 
the CDM Executive Board. To date, five LULUCF methodologies have been approved 
by the CDM for afforestation on degraded land, reforestation with multiple use forest on 
degraded land with harvesting, afforestation/reforestation for industrial/commercial 
uses, and through control of animal grazing and assisted natural regeneration, and of land 
under agricultural use
7, and one small scale <8ktCO2 absorption methodology have been 
approved. The Moldova project was the first and only to be registered as of this paper (in 
April 2006), while the other 5 methodologies are at the validation stage 
(www.cd4cdm.org UNEP RISOE CDM Analysis). 
 
The approved LULUCF methodologies can be used by communities engaging in these 
types of activities, unless they wish to and are able to undertake the lengthy and costly 
process of developing their own methodology. Guidelines for small scale projects were 
put in place in 2003, but only one such methodology exists (AR-AMS0001), and no 
LULUCF projects have been verified in this modality
8. This small scale modality of the 
regulatory market is the one that is expected to more easily include more pro-poor 
carbon transactions, although even to reach the 8000 tons of carbon minimum, 
institutions and organizations of pro-poor carbon sellers may need to work together to 
jointly propose small scale carbon offset methodologies and projects, but this has not 
been demonstrated. 
 
The price per carbon credit is not very attractive given the transaction costs of obtaining 
them, and the fact that they expire. FAO high-quality LULUCF projects may cost US$3 - 
US$10 or more per ton of CO2equivalent (US$10 - US$35 per ton of carbon) (Trexler 
2003). BioCarbon Fund projects are expected to deliver between 400,000 and 800,000 
tons of CO2  equivalents over a period of 10-15 years. In return, a typical BioCarbon 
Fund project will receive about US$2-3 million in payments – which is US$3-4 per ton of 
CO2e
9 (Pearson et al. 2005). 
 
Low-income communities are finding it difficult to participate in the CDM market at this 
time, due to the above disincentives and the lack of affordable advisory and project 
development support services. The pipeline of community-based CDM projects is 
primarily found in the World Bank BioCarbon Fund and others supported by non-profit 
conservation groups. 
 
                                                 
6 Ecosystem Marketplace Ecosystem Services Matrix Feb 2007   
7 Moldova, China, Brazil, Albania and Honduras 
8 http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/registered.html 
9 CO2e is an abbreviation of 'carbon dioxide equivalent' and is the internationally recognized measure 
of greenhouse emissions.  
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Non-Kyoto Regulatory Carbon. Although Australia and the United States did not sign 
on to the Kyoto Protocol, carbon emission markets and transactions are evolving in 
these, the two highest per capita carbon-emitting countries. The Northeastern United 
States evolving Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) will include afforestation, 
and methane capture from farming, but only from lands in the United States. The 
Oregon Standard that was implemented in 1997 is open to land based carbon 
sequestration internationally. The third scheme in this category, the New South Wales 
also provides for carbon sequestration through forestry. 
 
In Oregon, emissions reductions requirements for new power plants can be offset by 
paying mitigation funds to a non profit organization called Climate Trust, which 
implements projects that avoid or sequester CO2 emissions. Three of fourteen projects in 
their portfolio are land based (forest) sequestration projects, including one in Ecuador by 
partners Jatun Sacha and Conservation International for 65,500 metric tons in a 99-year 
project lifetime (www.climatetrust.org). Offset project credits sell between US$6-
US$10/ton of CO2e (Bayon et al. 2007). 
 
Eight states of the east coast of the US are developing the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) to regulate emissions from electric utilities in the region. Only 3.3% of 
emissions may be covered by offsets in projects occurring offsite from the emission, and 
this includes capturing landfill methane, planting trees and energy efficiency programs 
(Biello 2006), but this has so far planned only to include afforestation, and only from 
land in the United States
10. As such it does not apply to this research on globally defined 
pro-poor Compensation and Rewards fro Ecosystem Services. 
 
The New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme launched in 2003 with a 
focus also on reducing energy sector emissions. It uses a cap-and-trade market 
mechanism and excessive emissions can be mitigated via surrendering the NSW 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Certificates (NGAC’s), or by paying an US$11/tonne fine. 
The mitigation market trades 7 million tons of CO2e at an average price of US$10. 
Certificates can be created from carbon sequestration projects from forests located in 
Australia which meet the sinks regulations of the Kyoto Protocol, and conditions set out 
in the NSW Framework on Carbon Sequestration. The only supplier to have actually 
delivered NGAC's created through carbon sequestration is Forests NSW, the 
government forestry agency, which sold 65,000 NGACs in 2005. In April 2006, energy 
producer Country Energy and forester, CO2 Group signed a deal to provide 30,000 
hectares of Mallee eucalypt planting in rural NSW. The contract is to provide 3.2 million 
tonnes of carbon pollution offsets – making the contract worth about AUS$41 million 
(Hanley 2006).  
 
Voluntary Carbon Market. The voluntary carbon market has grown rapidly over the 
last 15 years. From the perspective of voluntary transactions that relate to land based 
carbon, we include the Chicago Climate Exchange, where individual governments, 
private sector buyers and individuals purchase credits, as well as land based credits that 
are sold by a large number of existing retailers. By 2005, the voluntary market grew to 
US$46 million (7.5 million tons), and some estimate that by 2006 it could increase up to 
50 million tons of carbon equivalent (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006).  
 
                                                 
10 New York State Dept of Environmental Conservation website at: 
http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/environmentdec/2006a/greenhousegases122005.html 
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Retailers that sell carbon emission offset credits to various types of buyers often include 
carbon sequestration projects in their portfolio. A 2006 study reports that 56% of the 
credits sold from retailers originate in carbon sequestration projects (Harris 2006) and 
most are from projects in developing countries. Since the voluntary market allows greater 
flexibility in deals between private sector buyers and carbon ‘growers’ or ecosystem 
managers that sell the carbon offsets, there are both increased interest in this sector, but 
similarly depending on the standards demanded and risk tolerance of the buyer, 
potentially more difficulties. A much smaller segment of buyers are individuals who 
offset their personal and household emissions buying from retailers.  
 
Motivations moving buyers include the potential of achieving multiple benefits with 
LULUCF projects, including social, economic and biodiversity improvements. 40% of 
European voluntary carbon purchasers would pay a premium for carbon obtained from 
multiple benefit projects (Dannaker 2006). This market segment also includes forest 
conservation projects, as well as reforestation and afforestation.  
 
Governments are among the buyers in the voluntary market, often channeling their 
support to carbon projects through international assistance, including overseas 
development assistance, World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (GEF). No 
developing country government is buying carbon to directly offset their own emissions, 
as researched by the authors. Nonetheless, both the Argentine Carbon fund and 
Mexico’s Carbon Biodiversity Agroforestry (CABSA)
11 Ecosystem Services Program 
serve as brokers, helping to prepare carbon projects for sale. In the case of the Argentine 
Fund, credits are purchased from the projects to then be re-sold (Krolik 2006). 
  
The Mexican CABSA PES Program is aimed at carbon, biodiversity & agroforestry 
systems. It started in 2004, and until 2007 funding was obtained from the same source of 
money as the National Forestry Commission’s Hydrological Services Program, namely, 
via a targeted tax on industrial water use. Allocation to both programs comes from the 
federal budget on a yearly basis. Single landowners can only apply for one of the 
programs only, and receive payment for one ecosystem service. Between 2004-2007, the 
program gave seed money to support development of a required land management plan, 
secondly, to help cover project implementation costs, and thirdly, to provide technical 
support to participants to establish high quality carbon sequestration projects. No 
support is provided to find a market to sell to. 
 
Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) is a voluntary, but legally binding rules-based 
greenhouse gas emission reduction trading system
12. Companies join CCX voluntarily 
and trade carbon financial instruments, measured in tons of Co2e. The Chicago Climate 
Exchange traded 1.45 million tons of Co2e in 2005, for a total value of US US$2.7 
million (Bayon et al. 2007). While only 1/50
th of CCX transactions are project-based 
offsets, the remainder are trades of allowances originating from members reducing their 
emissions and buying and selling these allowances. The CCX does allow carbon from 
developing countries and have recently approved carbon from a private company based 
in South Africa Precious Woods for sale through CCX. That carbon, in fact, is now 
being sold to the World Bank to make their operations ‘carbon neutral’. Average trading 
                                                 
11 Programa para Desarollar el Mercado de Servicios  Ambeintales por Captura de Carbono y los 
Derivados de la Biodiversidad y para fomenter el establecimiento y mejoraramiento de Sistemas 
Agroforestales. In 2005, CABSA allocated US$10 million for 169,031 hectares.   
12 www.chicagoclimatex.com 
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price for 2006 of the Chicago Climate Exchange was US$3.6/ton (inclusive of all types 
of offset projects). 
 
Sellers of LULUCF carbon offsets include poor and non-poor resource owners mostly in 
forested areas, although some lesser biomass ecosystems are also being included in these 
transactions. In most cases, communities in tandem with NGO’s engage in transactions 
with carbon buyers, while many international donors have their own links to 
communities and carbon sellers in less developed countries. 
 
2.6 Markets that Bundle Ecosystem Services 
 
For a number of reasons, it may be desirable to ‘bundle’ payments for different 
ecosystem services from the same resource. As indicated above, the level of payments in 
most CRES is not, under current market conditions, generally high enough to offset 
opportunity costs or cover necessary investments for the change in land use. It is 
essential to have complementary income flows, either from commercial and subsistence 
products from the resource, or from other CRES.  
 
Theoretically, it is feasible to bundle carbon sequestration or storage services with most 
of the other ecosystem services, as long as additional carbon is being sequestered that 
would not be sequestered under the status quo land use. However, efforts to 
institutionalize requirements for other ecosystem co-benefits from the CDM were 
unsuccessful for political reasons. Nonetheless, a number of other initiatives are 
encouraging such bundling, including the World Bank’s BioCarbon Fund, the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Alliance, and the new carbon fund being developed by the 
United Nations Development Programme for projects that also support the Millennium 
Development Goals. Conservation organizations such as The Nature Conservancy and 
WWF are seeking to incorporate biodiversity objectives systematically into watershed 
protection payments. At this time, however, only a small portion of CRES payments are 
for bundles of ecosystem services; most are for single services. Some agri-environmental 
payments explicitly exclude opportunities for bundling, to avoid ‘paying twice’ on the 
same land. 
 
New approaches are being explored in some public payment systems, particularly in 
developed countries, to assign overall ecosystem values to lands, so that landowners who 
have been good stewards in the past would receive payments as well as those who 
improve degraded lands, and so that integrated ecosystem service management would be 
recognized and encouraged. It is expected that as markets mature, new institutional 
mechanisms will arise to enable bundling. 
 
3. Economic and Policy Processes Shaping CRES and their 
Impact on the Poor 
 
How will the evolution of CRES affect the poor? The answer depends upon the success 
with which the rural poor and their advocates can shape these markets to meet pro-poor 
criteria. This section highlights the ongoing political debates and economic factors 
affecting market development, to identify where strategic intervention points may lie. 
 




3.1 National and Local Processes Shaping CRES Markets 
 
Core national and local processes will shape economic demand for ecosystem services, 
and also the institutions evolving for CRES. Key elements are trends in ecosystem health, 
trends in environmental policy, socioeconomic trends, and local awareness of CRES. 
 
Trends in ecosystem health. Investment in institutional development for CRES is 
likely to accelerate in part due to perceived importance of ecosystem services and threats 
to them. Thus countries and regions will vary depending upon the impacts of climate 
change, economic threats from invasive species (e.g., to tourism or water resources or 
agriculture). Improved quality of science on ecosystem services will likely facilitate the 
development of CRES, by quantifying the financial values for beneficiaries, and reducing 
the risks to both buyers and sellers of services. Politically powerful or vocal groups 
affected by deteriorating ecosystem health, are likely to shape the rules of new 
mechanisms. 
 
Trends in environmental policy. In many developing countries there is a lack of 
awareness of basic environmental issues, and weak capability of political figures and 
judges to handle environmental questions. Environmental laws remain quite weak, 
particularly in Africa and parts of Asia. A key question is whether environmental policy 
will become stronger or weaker in these countries. An element of the debate on CRES is 
likely to be whether these new instruments are distracting attention from key 
conservation issues, or represent an effective response to them. Overall trends in 
corruption will have a large impact on environmental policy generally, and particularly for 
ensuring the credibility of CRES contracts, and trust of market actors in public 
institutions responsible for collecting and disbursing payments. 
 
As governments and civil society increasingly recognize the critical role of ecosystems in 
underpinning prosperity, political processes will accelerate demands on governments and 
businesses to protect resources. The relative balance in using different political 
instruments to address this goal will depend in part on political factors, including the 
balance of political power of beneficiaries and providers of ecosystem services, and the 
capacity of the state to implement direct regulation of ecosystems or mobilize public 
investment. CRES can in some cases de-politicize environmental policy by creating a 
systematic mechanism for making claims on resources and demand stewardship. For 
such systems to be accepted, they must be seen as legitimate, in terms of effectively 
protected resources for the public good and equitably allocating costs and benefits. Their 
role in contributing to national Poverty Reduction Strategies needs to be clarified, and 
CRES mobilized more strategically to jointly achieve poverty reduction/alleviation and 
ecosystem goals. 
 
Socioeconomic trends. Urbanization trends may raise awareness of economic 
dependence on healthy ecosystems and thus the openness of beneficiaries to the use of 
CRES, particularly under political economy conditions where urban groups cannot easily 
impose priorities on rural resource owners and managers. Gaps between rich and poor 
groups are likely to widen, with large numbers of people stuck in absolute poverty. 
Meanwhile, the pressures of economic growth may lead to policies that encourage 
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foreign direct investments that have negative impacts on the environment. The attraction 
of pro-poor CRES will vary by country and region depending upon trends in poverty 
levels. At the same time, there is likely to be a modest increase in businesses related to 
environmental conservation, but these will likely be targeted on small parts of the 
landscape, specific economies and selected natural resources. 
 
Local awareness of CRES. Opportunities for low-income communities to become 
engaged profitably in CRES will depend centrally on the degree to which they are aware 
of these opportunities and able to engage in the design of policy and program 
frameworks. New mechanisms are arising to raise awareness. Examples include the 
Community Forum of the Katoomba Group (www.katoombagroup.org), a number of 
Indigenous Peoples organizations that are briefing members about CRES (e.g, Sierra 
Gorda in Mexico), and the new Community Knowledge Service for Biodiversity and 
Livelihoods that is promoting knowledge-sharing among communities engaged actively 
in ecosystem management (www.equatorinitiative.org/cks). 
 
3.2. International Processes 
 
A number of international processes are accelerating the development of CES, and are 
subject to influence towards pro-poor paradigms during this transitional phase. Key 
processes to monitor and influence include: transformation of agricultural subsidies, the 
search for new modalities to implement multilateral environmental agreements; growing 
investments in CRES by multilateral development banks, the private sector and the 
international conservation community; and global dialogues on natural resource rights. 
Evolving international dialogue is likely to shape CRES systems directly, and broaden the 
range of models for both negotiated contracts and market mechanisms well beyond the 
models currently popularized by the Costa Rica public payments, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) flexibility mechanisms, and 
U.S.-Europe agri-environmental payments. 
 
Transformation of agricultural subsidies. The participation of farmers and farming 
communities in CRES for biodiversity conservation in developing countries will be 
driven by international trade agreements, national farm policies in many countries are 
shifting from providing agricultural subsidies to focusing on other means of supporting 
rural livelihoods, such as agri-environmental payments. This trend is most profound in 
the United States and Europe, but developing countries have also been required to cut 
certain types of agricultural subsidies under World Trade Organization (WTO) 
agreements. In the relevant countries, this shift could significantly increase public 
payments to farmers for watershed protection, biodiversity conservation, and other 
environmental services. The ability of poor farmers to participate in CRES programs may 
depend on whether these programs allow land to remain in agricultural production or 
require land to be taken out of production. This, in turn, may hinge on the availability of 
scientific studies demonstrating the potential of agricultural production systems 
employing particular management practices to provide desired ecosystem services, as has 
been done in the New York City-Catskill watershed CRES program. 
 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Most of the multilateral environmental 
agreements (Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Convention to Combat 
Desertification (CCD), UNFCCC and Ramsar) have begun to discuss and pursue ways 
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for signatory governments to achieve convention objectives through CRES. In 2004 and 
2005, international meetings were convened to discuss the potential to develop CRES 
that integrate ecosystem services of interest under various agreements (UNEP 2005). 
Opportunities include the inclusion of an international version of wetland mitigation 
banking into RAMSAR, or incentive-based schemes for protecting migratory species 
under Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) or 
Biodiversity Offset payments discussed within the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
The international conventions may also define and constrain the possibilities for CRES 
mechanism; e.g., the UN CBD defines property rights to genetic resources, which in turn 
defines opportunities and constraints for trade of those resources.  
 
CRES will be affected by trends in regionalization of economies, which may require 
agreed rules for CRES. With the increased sharing and managing of transboundary 
resources, regionally integrated CRES policies and instruments may be needed, or the 
institutional challenges may reduce the likelihood of using such tools. Overall, 
international processes are beginning to support CRES as having potential to support 
conservation finance (Govt. of Costa Rica et al. 2005). 
 
Inter-governmental investment in PES. Almost all of the international development 
banks (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank IADB, Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), African Development Bank (AfDB)) and other agencies (GEF and the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)) have begun to invest in the 
development of CRES schemes, primarily in the form of public payments, particularly 
for biodiversity and watershed services (Forest Trends 2006). This second generation of 
payment systems is still largely modeled on earlier Costa Rica PES and U.S. agri-
environmental payments, with a focus on individual farmers and forest owners, central 
designation of criteria, and dependence on public sector finance. As these are 
implemented in areas with different tenure arrangements, weaker public sector agencies, 
etc., it can be expected that the models will diversify.  
 
Increased corporate social responsibility among many multinationals, especially those 
based in North America and Europe, may welcome CRES as market-friendly approaches 
to environmental protections. On the other hand, increasing foreign direct investment 
for growing commodity markets (e.g., agricultural commodities for export from Africa to 
China and India, biofuels exports) may increase negative effects on environment and 
discourage or overwhelm local initiatives for CRES. There is considerable interest among 
the inter-governmental agencies in promoting pro-poor models for CRES that would 
contribute to achieving the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
International conservation agency investment in PES. International conservation 
organizations have long been in engaged in financing local conservation projects, 
particularly for biodiversity. Mechanisms used have largely been direct purchase of land, 
subsidies for conservation management implemented through trust funds; and – 
particularly in higher-income countries – conservation easements that provide their 
owners with tax benefits. Conservation International (CI) has been involved in direct 
payments for biodiversity conservation, including conservation concessions, and were 
leaders in the CCBA, an initiative to promote carbon projects with biodiversity and 
livelihood co-benefits. While WWF was opposed to carbon payments for LULUCF for 
some time, they are now experimenting with approaches for watershed payments and 
even some voluntary carbon market. These organizations will likely become significant 
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philanthropic buyers and intermediaries in markets for voluntary carbon and biodiversity 
offsets, while also catalyzing and supporting institutional development for private sector 
buyers. While the first generation of CRES projects by this sector were highly focused on 
ecosystem benefits, those now in the pipeline often have explicit objectives to benefit 
low-income people living in the target ecosystems. 
 
Private financial investment in PES.  While those concerned with sustainable rural 
development and poverty reduction have been exploring CRES through pilot field 
projects and public finance initiatives, the private financial sector is entering these new 
markets from entirely different perspectives. Major corporations, such as Citibank and 
Goldman Sachs are exploring commercial products and services they can provide to the 
growing international ecosystem service markets. (Goldman Sachs recently set up a 
center to support innovative approaches.) The major initial driver was opportunities in 
the carbon market, but a number of companies are also developing financial products for 
watershed services. For example, the insurance company Forest-Re is developing 
products for large-scale commercial carbon and watershed service projects. Some 
companies, particularly in the forest industry and wetlands development in the U.S. and 
Australia are positioning themselves as large-scale commercial sellers and real estate 
developers for selling ecosystem services. As intermediary institutions develop to serve 
these larger-scale commercial markets, they may influence the commercial environment 
for low-income sellers, and certainly their position in and share of the value chain. 
 
Global dialogues on natural resource rights. The emergence of CRES as an 
instrument for investment in ecosystem stewardship is occurring in parallel with broader 
international dialogues and policy change about rights and benefit-sharing from 
biodiversity and ecosystem management. Devolution of forests, rangelands and 
conservation areas to local communities, and strengthening of indigenous rights, is 
changing the terms of negotiation between suppliers and beneficiaries of ecosystem 
services. Developing platforms for public consultation on conservation policy are also 
creating both contexts and opportunities for negotiation on ecosystem services, as well as 
land rights and use/harvest rights for products (further discussed in ICRAF Working 
Paper no. 39). 
 
Scientific advances in biodiversity assessment and monitoring. One limitation to 
the proliferation of biodiversity conservation payments is the difficulty in verifying that 
services have been provided and in establishing equivalency units or a tradable 
‘commodity’ for biodiversity conservation (Agius 2001). Buyers of biodiversity 
conservation services will be willing to pay only if they can be reasonably certain that the 
services are actually being provided. Yet, the complex nature of biodiversity itself as well 
as the difficulty in measuring it either directly (which is extremely time consuming) or 
indirectly (which relies on proxies, of which few reliable ones exist) present significant 
challenges. Some credible methods for quantifying the biodiversity benefit of land use or 
management practices have been developed and may be used in the context of CRES 
programs. But large-scale biodiversity payments will require more scientific development 
and new, cost-effective monitoring methods (Scherr et al. 2007a).  
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3.3 Processes Affecting CRES for Biodiversity Services 
 
Biodiversity conservation services are generally considered to be the most difficult 
ecosystem services to be transformed into defined units marketable by landowners and 
managers. This is mainly because the science for tracing the link between biodiversity, 
management of resources to conserve biodiversity, and financial benefits for different 
actors is still in its infancy. Biodiversity conservation services are also the least likely to be 
transformed into ‘commodities,’ which are by definition standardized and thus easily 
exchanged. Thus biodiversity market segments are likely to operate as ‘niche’ markets for 
some time, without the economies of scale that characterize commodity markets. 
 
These constraints are loosening, however, as specific private economic benefits from 
biodiversity are being identified, as governance for biodiversity protection is developing 
relevant public and private payment mechanisms, as businesses are being required – or 
determining it is in their business interest – to limit their biodiversity impacts, and as 
opportunities for ‘bundling’ biodiversity benefits into other types of ecosystem services 
are being devised. 
 
Increased scarcity and value of biodiversity services providing private benefits. 
Land stewards may, in fact, find private beneficiaries of the biodiversity conservation 
services they provide, who are willing to pay for these services as their scarcity increases. 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment quantified the huge economic losses associated 
with loss of wild pollinators, leading to new initiatives to pay for pollinator habitat 
protection. Likewise, financial value of spawning and other critical habitats for 
commercial fisheries are growing, creating an (as yet largely unrealized) opportunity for 
payments. The emerging ‘gene revolution’ is re-sparking interest in conservation payment 
schemes. Examples are emerging of community compensation to stewards of wild 
habitats providing medicinal plants considered critical to local health. Bio-prospecting 
could develop new modalities still not identified that would overcome these barriers. 
 
Expanding public payments for biodiversity services. As described above, 
government agencies responsible for wildlife conservation in most developed and some 
developing countries have devised a wide range of CRES initiatives to pay private 
landowners directly for habitat and (mainly endangered) species conservation. ‘Best 
practice’ design of public conservation payments are currently shifting to be more 
targeted on high-conservation-value sites, rather than standard payments to all 
participants.  
 
Today these impact a very small proportion of land area, but could expand significantly 
in countries with high current farm subsidies, as they transfer from commodity payments 
to the ‘green window’ approaches more consistent with present World Trade 
Organization rules. Because these often shift funding away from traditional subsidy 
recipients, political factors will determine how widespread their adoption is. Recent 
challenges even to ‘green window’ payments have been raised by countries with low 
overall farm subsidies (Australia, Canada etc.), as a restraint of trade. The outcome of 
these political debates will influence the scope and scale of farm bills and public 
procurement from green landscape certification as sources of finance for biodiversity 
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CRES. The extent to which low-income producers will benefit from these policies is an 
open question. 
 
Public procurement policies by municipalities, countries, states and national governments 
are increasingly used to promote eco-certified products (e.g., for schools, hospitals, 
prisons, government building construction). In a few cases, these are being designed 
explicitly to be pro-poor. 
 
Increasing business responsibility for biodiversity conservation. Regulation has 
been the principal policy instrument used to limit damage to biodiversity from industrial, 
mining, oil and gas, infrastructure and real estate development, usually through 
environmental impact assessment processes. But even with ‘best practice’ such 
developments commonly have a large negative impact on biodiversity. Public and 
stockholder pressure for corporate environmental sustainability and ‘license to operate’, 
as well as businesses seeking to benefit from green branding, are promoting much more 
aggressive responses. One is the development of voluntary ‘biodiversity-neutral’ or 
‘footprint-neutral’ (Global Footprint Network 2006) corporate policies which actively 
commit the company to offset unavoidable biodiversity loss, by investing in biodiversity 
protection or restoration in high-biodiversity-priority sites. Companies with such policies 
now include Beyond Petroleum, Chevron Texaco, Smithsonian, among others. The 
Business and Biodiversity Offset Project (BBOP) has engaged nearly a dozen companies 
in developing and testing methods for rigorous biodiversity offsets, and formalizing such 
action in policy.  
 
Forty-one international banks have committed to the Equator Principles, which is likely 
to raise the level of interest in market-like mechanisms for companies to comply with 
principles for biodiversity conservation. The extent to which these will explicitly 
incorporate poverty concerns depends upon the international standards that develop for 
design. In addition to voluntary offsets, biodiversity offsets have been incorporated into 
development regulations in at least five countries
13. 
 
Bundling biodiversity into CRES for other services. One way to generate financing 
for certain types of biodiversity conservation is to integrate non-use-value biodiversity 
objectives into CRES for other ecosystem services that have provide financially valuable 
use values. Native wetlands and riparian area biodiversity can potentially be protected 
through watershed protection payments; natural forest biodiversity can be protected 
through payments for carbon emission offsets or storage or smoke pollution reduction 
(from forest fires). There are currently major difficulties ‘bundling’ services in this way, 
because issues of additionality have not been resolved in these young markets, and most 
CRES systems perversely reward historical ‘bad actors’ rather than those who have 
provided good stewardship. Without such bundling, it is unlikely that CRES will provide 
a sufficiently high incentive for resource investment and/or land use change, so 
resolution of this problem is important. Critical intervention points for pro-poor, pro-
biodiversity CRES are to ensure such ‘bundling’ is fully incorporated in new CRES 
systems, and that eligible land uses for biodiversity conservation recognize use and 
harvest rights critical to the poor. 
 
Biodiversity certification in product markets. The international conservation 
community has historically viewed agriculture as a conservation threat, but is now 
                                                 
13 US, Canada, EU, Brazil and Australia 
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beginning to identify opportunities to conserve biodiversity in agricultural systems in and 
around protected areas and other high-biodiversity areas. Programs such as the World 
Bank’s Regional Integrated Silvopastoral Ecosystem Management Project (RISEMP) in 
Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Colombia are demonstrating the potential to use CRES to 
finance smallholders’ transition to agricultural practices that are simultaneously more 
productive, more profitable, and better for native biodiversity (Pagiola et al. 2004). Eco-
certified coffee and cocoa production for a number of international companies (e.g., 
Green Mountain Coffee, Starbucks) have set targets for sourcing at least a portion of 
their supply from low-income products, with explicit poverty reduction objectives. 
 
Currently, eco-certification systems provide a growing revenue stream to farmers in 
developing countries. Consumer-driven markets for certified agricultural products are 
sometimes, but not always, a form of CRES. That is, while some certified labels are 
intended primarily to capture consumers’ willingness to pay for environmental 
protection, others appeal more to those interested in personal health or social justice. 
There is some consumer confusion in the marketplace with multiple labels, and many 
changes can be anticipated. 
 
There are some constraints for eco-certification that will need to be addressed for 
continued large-scale growth. First, the assumed link between farm practices required by 
certification systems and the purported environmental benefits (especially biodiversity 
benefits) may be absent (Bowman-Hicks, pers. comm. 2005). For example, production of 
organic crops on large, mechanized farms may deliver little biodiversity benefit, especially 
compared with small-scale rustic production systems that are not certified. Efforts now 
underway by the Rainforest Alliance and others to remedy this situation by developing 
certification standards that are more rigorously linked to conservation outcomes are a 
critical step in solidifying eco-certification as a valid CRES modality.  
 
Also biodiversity conservation is usually strongly dependent on scale and thresholds, 
which may put smallholders at a disadvantage for selling biodiversity conservation 
services unless they are able to collaborate together with nearby land stewards to create 
ecologically meaningful blocks of habitat. Efforts such as the Talamanca Initiative in 
Costa Rica and Panama are developing a strategy of ‘horizontal integration’ to enable 
small-scale producers to enter certified markets requiring large and continuous, high-
quality supply (Vargas 2007). But there are generally significant barriers for small-scale 
producers and communities to enter certified markets. Factors include the use of 
standards with little local relevance, the high cost of certifiers, and the high cost of 
monitoring, other costs for small organizations, and the lack of premiums sufficient to 
cover these costs (Molnar et al. 2005).  
3.4 Processes Affecting CRES for Landscape Beauty and Recreation 
 
The evolution of CRES for landscape beauty and recreation are likely to be affected by 
several factors: supply chain development, evolution of buyer preferences, and impacts 
of rising energy costs on nature tourism. 
 
Supply chain development. Although payments for landscape beauty and recreational 
use are perhaps the oldest environmental service markets, in many respects they are 
poorly developed (Landell-Mills & Porras 2002). A major reason is that, historically, the 
ecotourism ‘supply chain’ has disfavored land stewards while allowing tour operators, 
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concessionaires, and hospitality businesses to capture tourists’ willingness to pay for 
recreational and aesthetic amenities. This situation has begun to change, but the 
continued provision of tourist and recreational environmental services in national parks 
for free or well below market value undermines the ability of private land stewards to 
demand payments.  
 
Evolving buyer preferences. Given the vicissitudes of the global tourism industry – 
driven by factors such as the state of the global economy, the price of air transport, and 
the perceived state of international security – markets for tourism and recreation services 
may prove to be the most fickle of any of the major ecosystem service markets. 
Furthermore, the demand for such services is usually based less in scientific reality than 
in the preferences of tourists for a particular aesthetic or recreational experience. The 
changeability of such preferences implies a fluidity of demand for particular tourism and 
recreational services.  
 
Increased understanding of the potential negative impacts of tourism and protected areas 
on local communities – combined with growing influence of local communities in many 
areas – is contributing to a trend toward increased compensation and establishment of 
cooperative revenue-sharing agreements between park managers and local communities.  
 
But the preferences of tourists themselves have a significant effect on the extent to 
which tourism- and recreation-related CRES are likely to be pro-poor. For many 
ecotourists, meaningful interaction with local people (or ‘ethnotourism’) is considered 
highly desirable, implying that there is economic value to the local presence of rural and 
indigenous communities practicing traditional lifestyles. On the other hand, Landell-Mills 
and Porras (2002:168) argue that “local communities are frequently viewed to be 
detracting value from nature-based holidays.” In such situations, even if local landowners 
can capture a portion of tourism revenues, tourist demands that they become ‘invisible’ 
components of the landscape may undermine their livelihood strategies. In places like 
Africa, increased international demand for tourism seems likely to result in increased 
incentives for conservation of Africa’s scenery and wildlife that are attractive to tourists. 
 
Cost of energy. A high proportion of the cost of nature tourism is for transport to reach 
the remote, rural sites where the benefits of landscape beauty and recreation in nature 
can be found. Rising energy prices on patterns of nature and eco-tourism mean that the 
communities potentially benefitting from CRES for this ecosystem service may be mainly 
in the most unique settings, or those that can rely more on local and nationally-based 
clients. 
 
3.5 Processes Affecting CRES for Watershed Protection Services  
 
New opportunities for CRES for watershed protection will be affected by a number of 
key factors, including the evolving regulatory environment, the institutional frameworks 
emerging for landscape and watershed management, and the evolving science of 
watershed management.  
 
Evolving regulatory environment. An important policy question is the extent to which 
the development of watershed CRES will be affected or driven by regulatory changes. In 
the United States and Australia, for example, trading schemes based around water quality 
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and salinity, respectively, have created demand for ecosystem services and spurred the 
creation of markets for such services. It remains to be seen whether some developing 
countries will eventually enact similar regulations. On the other hand, command and 
control regulations can hinder the formation of ecosystem service markets: to the extent 
that governments can successfully regulate problematic environmental actions such as 
deforestation, prospective sellers of ecosystem services will have less leverage to 
command a price for voluntarily acting as responsible land stewards.  
 
Particularly in Asia, water pollution from industries and urban areas causing negative 
impacts downstream and actually limiting economic development. This has been a major 
issue and efforts to regulate the problem could become a driver for CRES.  
 
Evolving institutional framework for landscape and watershed management. After 
trying out many different institution models for planning and protection of watersheds 
that span different political boundaries, institutional innovations have been identified that 
facilitate participatory multi-stakeholder planning and action (Swallow et al. 2005). 
Collective action across rural organizations is also developing in some places that can 
enable aggregating producers across heterogeneous contributions, with application for 
CRES. The further development and adaptation of these models will greatly affect the 
potential for organizing pro-poor PES. Arrangements are further complicated by new 
international arrangements for trans-boundary watershed management. 
 
Evolving science of watershed management. There is, as yet, inadequate scientific 
information linking specific land use and land management practices to the resulting 
watershed protection services. To the extent that this information has been developed, it 
is often context-specific and non-transferable to distant watersheds. Furthermore, 
different watershed services may demand different management actions, thus creating 
conflicting land use mandates; for example, reforestation efforts may improve water 
quality but diminish water quantity to downstream users (Van Noordwijk 2005; Pagiola 
et al. 2002). 
 
One barrier to this conservation approach, however, is that many governments have 
serious revenue shortfalls caused by ineffective tax systems or depressed economies. 
Burgeoning social welfare demands compete with public sector investments in protected 
areas and natural resources management; the latter have actually declined in many 
countries during the past decade. A related problem is that using general revenues may 
not be equitable since some people and businesses use much more water than others do. 
In the next 10-20 years, growth in payments by state and municipal governments may be 
more significant than from federal funds.  
 
3.6 Processes Affecting CRES for Carbon Sequestration and Storage 
 
Different factors will be shaping the evolution of regulatory and voluntary carbon 
markets related to land use and management. 
 
Evolution of regulated markets. Countries benefiting from the CDM so far are large 
middle-income developing countries, while the majority in the developing world has still 
to take part. Many ‘Designated Operational Entities’ and Designated National 
Authorities (of the CDM) in Latin America have recently carried out workshops and 
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training to encourage and facilitate the use of the CDM mechanism in their countries. 
These Designated Operational Entities approve country projects based on their own 
definition of sustainable development, thus, these agencies will play a role in promoting 
and facilitating pro-poor CRES- within the confines of the CDM.  
 
It appears that forestry emission reduction projects will continue to be restricted from 
participating in offsetting Green House Gas (GHG) emissions associated with Kyoto 
Protocol compliance targets through 2012 - the first commitment period, within member 
countries. This is reflected in the World Bank's 2006 Report with LULUCF projects 
accounting for only 1% of the 2005 traded volumes (Capoor and Ambrosi 2006). 
 
Nonetheless, within the Kyoto framework for the regulatory carbon market, avoided 
deforestation as a source of carbon credits is currently being revisited, which would 
greatly increase the potential participation of pro-poor transactions of the CDM market. 
Proposals from countries have been received by the UNFCCC and continue to be 
discussed in meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice for 
possible inclusion into the 2
nd phase of Kyoto, post 2012. The main reason it was not 
included in the first commitment phase related to methodological issues of leakage 
(changes in GHG emissions in locations outside the project boundary) and permanence. 
Many countries and organizations are proposing mechanisms to address how to include 
carbon credits from avoided deforestation in these countries. 
 
Subsequent to numerous pressures to include LULUCF credits in the European Union 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), a Technical Workshop on the matter was held at 
the British Council co-chaired by 4 European governments in early 2006. Efforts to 
influence the European Commission and member states regarding the inclusion of 
LULUCF carbon in its second phase are estimated to take between 1-3 years
14. The 
inability of Carbon Emissions Rights from forestry to be traded in the EU ETS remains a 
powerful disincentive to the broader growth and development of a forest based carbon 
market. 
 
In addition, some broader re-thinking is also afoot by developed countries regarding the 
potential role of forestry offsets in national markets. On the one hand, Costa Rica 
announced that it will embark on a country level Carbon neutral, which will involve 
“cultivating a carbon certificate market that aims to not only boost carbon capture and 
storage in the nation’s forests, but also help maintain their scenic beauty” (Vargas 2007). 
Two opposing examples are Canada and the United States where in order to direct 
investment to local domestic producers, there are limits under discussion to using out of 
country LULUCF offsets, for example in some Canadian provinces, and in the RGGI 
and other western states carbon markets. Thus, as buyers from developed countries 
come to be more regulated by domestic markets with requirements to meet offsets via 
domestic markets, the potential for these buyers to look southwards to carbon offset 
projects in developing countries will be lessened. 
 
Evolution of the Voluntary Carbon Market. The advent of new players, coupled with 
strong climate-oriented marketing efforts by environmental organizations indicates that 
the voluntary market will grow considerably in 2006. The Chicago Climate Exchange, 
which allows forestry offsets from U.S., Mexican and Brazilian carbon sequestration 
projects, including reforestation, afforestation or conservation projects, is expected to 
                                                 
14 Personal communication with Toby Janson-Smith, Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance.  
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evolve and grow faster than others (Biello 2005). Nonetheless, the voluntary carbon 
market is rapidly becoming synonymous with the market for renewable energy credits 
(RECs) – allowances that are created by wind, solar, biomass, and other renewable 
generation in the United States. In fact, as improvements in technology occur, increases 
in the efficiency of reducing emissions in cheaper ways will tend to make credits sourced 
from LULUCF become less competitive. Nonetheless, in the meanwhile, forestry 
carbon’s immediate sequestration potential is very attractive. 
 
Policy processes and legislative adjustments being made in the voluntary market and in 
developing countries facilitate and promote purchases and transactions in LULUCF 
carbon credits. As an example, the Mexican Carbon Biodiversity Ecosystem Service 
Program (CABSA) will undergo considerable changes starting 2008. The World Bank 
provided the Mexican government with a loan alongside a GEF project received by the 
Mexican government to sponsor the development of an integrated PES program that 
blends the hydrological Program and CABSA program into one entity. The funding that 
the program provides to participants will still come from the government via federal 
allocations as well as the World Bank loan and grant
15. 
 
Another important set of processes underway involve the work to lend more credibility, 
transparency and uniformity in the methodologies of creating land based carbon credits. 
Related to this, continued work on standards for certifying multiple benefit carbon 
projects for both the voluntary and regulated carbon markets exists. Two examples that 
include or are in fact aimed at ensuring high quality forest carbon offsets are the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity Alliance standards, and the World Resources Institute 
(WRI)/World Business Council for Sustainable Development standards. In addition, a 
new set of standards promoted by the International Emissions Trading Association 
(IETA) and the Climate Group will establish a tradable Voluntary Carbon Unit to 
promote the voluntary carbon market. This standard is currently only considering the 
inclusion of carbon emission reduction credits sourced from LULUCF projects and 
activities, so limitations on pro-poor land use based carbon sales would continue if these 
activities are not included. The Gold Standard, being devised by the World Wildlife 
Fund, seeks to define criteria for bolstering the sustainable development 
outcomes/potentials of the carbon sales, applicable to both the voluntary and regulatory 
markets. The Gold Standard is developing a criteria focusing on the pro-poor potential 
of the Certified Emission Reductions (CER) and Voluntary Emission Reductions (VER) 
it certifies, but again in this case, forestry based carbon activities are not included.  
 
 
4. CRES with Promising Potential for the Poor and for 
Ecosystems  
 
This section explores the potential of CRES to benefit the poor as well as ecosystems 
managed by the poor over the next 20 years. A key aspect of CRES is that they must 
make payments contingent on the verifiable delivery of the ecosystem services 
contracted, whether or not low-income producers or consumers are involved (Wunder 
                                                 
15 Personal Interview of Elizabeth Shapiro on research for her Dissertation, “Issues of Equity, 
Discourse of Value in National Payment for Environmental Service Programs of Mexico,” UC 
Berkeley. 
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2005). Pagiola and colleagues (2005) and others have argued persuasively that CRES 
programs must be designed with the principal aim of conserving ecosystem services in a 
cost-effective manner. While it is often desirable to reduce barriers or facilitate 
participation by poor people, if CRES programs target payments based on the location of 
poor people rather than on the distribution of lands providing valuable ecosystem 
services, then the entire premise of CRES as a contingent contract will be undermined.  
 
4.1 General Market Conditions for Pro-Poor Impacts 
Poor people will be able to benefit from CRES only when: 
1)  They own or manage land or resources that provide ecosystem services; 
2)  They are capable of managing this land to provide ecosystem services;  
3)  Mechanisms are in place to measure and verify the provision of ecosystem 
services so that poor people can receive compensation; and 
4)  Transaction costs associated with aggregating PES for many small-scale resource 
stewards can be effectively managed. 
 
In many regions of the world, poor people own or control many or most of the key 
ecosystem resources. For example, in Indonesia, 70% of the country is classified as forest 
domain and managed for watershed benefits, and this area is home to 50 million poor 
people. In other areas, though, it is large or wealthy landowners who control the most 
ecologically valuable lands. For example, in many cases the principal stewards of upper 
watershed areas are large-scale ranchers or cash crop producers, or the highest-value 
watershed resources are wetlands owned by wealthy farmers in the valleys. To identify 
the specific areas where poor people stand to benefit most from CRES will require 
region-by-region overlays of poverty with lands providing key ecosystem services. 
  
Of course, even where poor people control ecologically valuable lands and are 
participants in CRES programs, it is not certain that ecosystems will benefit. This is 
because management for certain ecosystem services may actually diminish other 
ecosystem services or overall environmental quality. Payments made for narrowly defined 
watershed or carbon sequestration services may ignore or even undermine broader 
ecosystem health, for example where carbon payments are made for tree plantations of 
non-native and invasive species. Management regimes put in place to justify payments for 
watershed services benefiting lowland irrigated farming may threaten water flows for 
wildlife habitat. However, these issues can be prevented through the design of CRES to 
consider the impact on overall ecological functioning, not just on a single ecosystem 
service.  
 
All of these markets have the potential to involve intermediaries who are not profit-
maximizers, and many such organizations are already taking a lead in helping to create 
knowledge and understanding about the mechanisms and modalities through which pro-
poor communities can participate in the carbon market. Witness efforts like the 
Katoomba Group networks in Africa and Tropical America
16 that pull together multi-
sectoral organizations focused on this work, and Forest Trends
17 Communities and 
Markets program that is dedicated to community and pro-poor education and capacity 
                                                 
16 www.katoombagroup.org 
17 www.forest-trends.org 
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building materials, and even a Social Carbon Fund
18 that brings together a development 
NGO, investor and retailer in Brazil. Certainly, the Tanzania International Small Groups 
Tree Planting Programme’s (TIST) non-profit arm is another example of the type of 
support being directed at this market segment, helping to efficiently channel 
development assistance money and funds from sale of carbon to groups on the ground. 
 
Finally, it is important to be realistic about the relative contribution of CRES to the 
livelihood strategies of low-income people in developing countries. While payment 
amounts vary considerably by the service being provided and the amount of land being 
managed, in most cases, CRES alone will not lift poor people out of poverty (Graff-
Zivin & Lipper 2006). Instead, it can provide an important source of income to diversify 
or supplement household livelihood strategies – especially since CRES income may be 
more reliable than income from agriculture or forest products. In addition, CRES can 
help finance a transition to more sustainable, diversified resource management activities 
by providing working capital for investment or by creating incentives for specific 
practices – from tree planting to water quality enhancement to replenishment of soil 
organic matter – that will ultimately improve land productivity as well as environmental 
quality (Pagiola et al. 2004; Scherr et al. 2007b).  
 
4.2 Evaluating Potential for Pro-Poor CRES 
To identify which of the CRES market sectors described in Section 2 will be of greatest 
importance for the poor requires overlaying an assessment of total demand for 
ecosystem services in each market sector with key criteria for pro-poor market design. 
Table 4 (see Annex) provides the authors’ assessment of the overall potential for 
different CRES markets to benefit the poor (and to benefit ecosystems managed by the 
poor). These assessments are based on the following criteria and are explained further for 
each market segment below.  
1)  The overall anticipated scale of buyer demand in each market segment, based on 
current market size as described in Section 2 and on growth trends and potential 
as described in Section 3; 
2)  The proportion of potential buyers requiring or preferring ecosystem services 
from resources owned or managed by the poor; and 
3)  The proportion of potential buyers with a preference for social co-benefits. 
 
Table 4 (in Annex) does not present predictions; rather they reflect the potential, if 
political and economic actions to shape CRES to benefit the poor are largely successful. 
Some of the key political and economic factors that will affect market development and 
impact on the poor are described in Section 3. Issue paper 2 of the CES Scoping Study 
(ICRAF Working paper no. 37) provides additional discussion of criteria for pro-poor 
CRES markets.  
                                                 
18 www.socialcarbon.org 
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4.3 Pro-Poor Potentials for Biodiversity CRES 
Payments to poor people for biodiversity conservation could become a major segment of 
the CRES market, on a par with or even exceeding the potentially large market for 
carbon sequestration. One major driver is the fact that poor people occupy many of the 
most biodiverse and most threatened lands in Latin America, Africa, and Asia (Molnar et 
al. 2005).  
 
Public payments to farmers and ranchers for biodiversity conservation will likely increase, 
with the potential to benefit low-income and indigenous communities in high-value 
biodiversity areas and in degraded ecosystems (Scherr et al. 2007a). Regulated markets in 
the form of wetland banks and conservation banks with credits traded on open markets 
are not anticipated to be large sources of income for low-income groups, in part because 
only high-income and middle-income countries in areas with good general market 
development will likely establish these, and even where they do (e.g., in South Africa or 
Mexico), few participants are likely to be poor. However, current efforts underway to 
institutionalize mandatory or voluntary biodiversity offsets for large development 
projects, if successful, could bring large amounts of funds to this market (Ten Kate et al. 
2004). Because many such projects occur in low-income regions of developing countries, 
poor people are the logical beneficiaries. High visibility and the right standards could 
encourage projects with high social co-benefits. 
 
The philanthropic market for biodiversity services appears poised for growth and, again, 
the presence of low-income populations in areas of high conservation value suggests that 
the poor could benefit significantly. Driving this growth, in part, is the trend of 
conservation organizations to move beyond strictly protected areas as a conservation 
strategy to focus on ecosystem or ecoregions, including privately managed agricultural 
areas, grasslands, and forests. Large conservation organizations such as WWF are 
explicitly promoting the development of markets for biodiversity services, while The 
Nature Conservancy and Conservation International both have experience using 
conservation easements and conservation concessions as a way of compensating 
landowners in exchange for providing conservation-friendly management of private 
lands.  
 
Eco-certified products, particularly for agriculture and non-timber forest products, are 
likely to increase very significantly over the next two decades, although dominated by 
non-poor producers. Among the reasons for this are the initial investments required to 
comply with certification requirements. Additionally, certification requires connecting to 
markets, which is difficult for small producers in remote locations without adequate 
access to roads or communication technology. Eco-certification does not necessarily 
have to bypass low-income producers, but in order to make sure it does not, 
intermediaries or buyers on the other end of the spectrum must particularly reach out to 
those segments of the population.  
 
We can expect to see a wide range of models for CRES in biodiversity, including many 
non-monetary ones in which compensation is in the form of more secure land and 
resource rights, provision of social services, etc. 
 
  36 
 
 
4.4 Pro-Poor Potentials for Landscape Beauty and Recreation CRES 
Payments to low-income communities for landscape beauty and recreation are likely to 
be geographically limited to those living in or adjacent to areas of high tourist attraction. 
The anticipated size of these markets is uncertain, there is potential for these to be 
integrated into park financing systems and new eco-tourism approaches. The most 
important buyers will be private tourist operators and related businesses, either directly 
or in aggregated groups working in a particular area of high scenic beauty. Private 
recreational hunters, fishermen and private park visitors will also likely become buyers of 
landscape beauty and recreation services. There are many models now for using public 
park visitor fees to benefit community groups who protect landscape and recreational 
values, and these could become significant. The overall size of market segments 
involving philanthropic and eco-certified product buyers seems likely to remain small, 
with an even smaller proportion for low-income communities, and regulated cap-and-
trade markets are not anticipated. 
 
There could potentially be negative impacts from private PES if flows of ecosystem 
services divert to private benefits at the expense of other social groups and of natural 
biodiversity. CRES for landscape beauty and recreation often include non-monetary 
compensation to communities, such as provision of services, but there may be difficulties 
in maintaining the conditional contract with private sector, for profit buyers over time 
without monetary payments. 
 
4.5 Pro-Poor Potentials for Watershed Protection CRES 
While the main market segments of watershed protection services – water quality and 
water flow, regulation – were analyzed separately for this exercise, the findings were 
similar. As discussed above, the location specificity of most watershed services is an 
important factor, and is likely to limit the overall scope of pro-poor watershed CRES: 
unlike carbon sequestration services, water-related services are not fungible, and are 
usually dependent on land use practices in a particular watershed or a part of a watershed. 
These critical watershed areas may amount to only a small portion of the land area in a 
region, and may or may not coincide with areas of high poverty. Chomitz et al. (2006), 
using geographic information system overlays, found that large areas of upland 
watersheds in specific countries in Latin America (e.g., Guatemala) did indeed coincide 
with high rates of poverty. Across Indonesia, 70% of the country – home to 50 million 
poor people – is classified as protected forest domain, largely for watershed protection. 
Thus, both public and private payments for water quality and water quantity, have the 
potential to evolve into significant areas for pro-poor CRES. 
 
The most promising watershed protection market segments are expected to be 
government buyers and the private voluntary market. These segments have the flexibility 
to work with low-income communities and are more likely to seek social co-benefits. 
Wherever water pollution, water scarcity, or flood threats originate with low-income 
communities, these communities may be targets for CRES. The number of such 
communities could be very large given anticipated watershed-related problems, especially 
in densely populated dry countries like India and China. 
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Philanthropic buyers will not likely be much involved in watershed markets, other than 
by subsidizing low-income beneficiaries to secure watershed services. Even within 20 
years, few low-income countries or low-income regions of middle-income countries will 
likely have the institutional resources to set up and manage regulated markets for water 
flow or quality, and none exist yet in developed countries for flood control. We may see 
the development of some eco-certified niche products that certify for water quality, but it 
is likely that such product markets will not be large and most producers will not be poor.  
 
4.6 Pro-Poor Potentials for Carbon Sequestration and Storage  
Of all CRES, the one with the greatest potential to support low-income rural landowners 
and managers is the carbon market, in particular the voluntary market and public 
government agency payments to carbon producers. Nonetheless, the need for high 
quality standardized forest carbon emissions reductions will rely on concerted efforts to 
pull together solid methodological standards. The window of opportunity is short for 
transforming carbon deals from transactions relying on trust between partners and 
institutions and project or location specific criteria to establishing the needed legal, 
scientific and regulatory frameworks for the transactions to stand alone solidly. The 
global forest carbon market is still small and fragile given the methodological and 
institutional complexities involved, and dedicated efforts to ensure a robust set of 
institutions and market rules that guarantees the needs of buyers and sellers, and society 
as a whole, are critical. 
 
Carbon-focused projects are more likely to involve monetary, rather than non-monetary 
compensation. Typically, these payments won’t get people out of poverty, but using 
payment to finance transition to more sustainable, diversified resource management 
activities are the key.  
 
Forestry based carbon emissions from developing countries are significant: from 18% to 
25% of global emissions of carbon from all sources (IPCC 2007, Stern Report 2006). As 
such, the incentive to create a mechanism that avoids this amount of carbon being put 
into the atmosphere yearly is overwhelming. In addition, as noted by the World Bank’s 
Biocarbon Fund “many countries, and especially the poorest ones, do not have the 
energy or industrial infrastructure that would allow them to benefit from the CDM in a 
significant way. For many, and in particular large rural populations that are the home of 
so many of the poor, sinks are the only significant avenue for participating in the carbon 
market” (www.carbonfinance.org). 
 
While the size of the voluntary market overall is likely to be much smaller than for the 
regulatory carbon markets (i.e. Kyoto CDM, EU Trading Scheme), the LULUCF 
component could be equally or more significant. This is because voluntary buyers 
(including philanthropic buyers) are more likely to be interested in demonstrating 
positive social co-benefits, and public sector buyers can choose to invest in low-income 
areas and to utilize carbon payments to restore degraded lands and forests on a large 
scale. The great advantage of carbon markets is that there are no geographic limits or 
minimum thresholds: a ton of carbon sequestered by a poor farmer hundreds of miles 
from any road has exactly the same value as a ton produced by a commercial plantation 
set-aside near the capital city.  
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Furthermore, increasing carbon stocks in farm soils and vegetation can often be 
accomplished while simultaneously increasing farm productivity. Such synergies are 
particularly valuable for smallholders in developing countries where diversification and 
risk-spreading are important components of a livelihood strategy.  
 
The Mexican CABSA program was preferentially targeted to marginalized forest owners 
(of which 80% are community based landowners), so the pro-poor potential of the 
program is promising. Applicants need to follow monitoring and implementation 
methodologies of the CDM, which are not published in languages other than English 
and also represent very high transaction costs in some cases, limiting the application to 
the poor. Giving money directly to technical support for preparing high quality carbon 
projects is quite novel. It is criticized though, for not providing support for finding 
markets to sell the carbon credits in, even though NGOs are playing such a role. 
 
The regulatory market segment is not considered very promising in terms of the short-
term growth potential for developing countries and communities of poor carbon offset 
sellers given the highly complex, costly and demanding procedures required to participate 
and deliver carbon credits to the market. Even though small scale projects can benefit 
from simplified modalities and procedures established by the CDM, scientific 
complexity, insufficient data and difficulties in monitoring LULUCF projects has led to 
criticism of the CDM mechanism. The regulated markets could still involve a large 
number of low-income suppliers if the ‘rules of the game’ explicitly encourage that. Since 
nationally based entities of the CDM guide the development and approval of country 
based projects, their ability to integrate the national and local sustainable development 
goals into their activities and mandates can result in more (or less) pro-poor outcomes. 
Few eco-certified projects today explicitly value carbon emission offsets, but it is likely 
that some will do so in the future. 
 
 
5. Research Questions on Patterns of CRES Development and 
Implications for Poverty Alleviation and Ecosystem Health  
 
The analysis in section 4 concluded that there are indeed major opportunities for CRES 
to benefit poor communities in the developing world, particularly in certain market 
segments. For CRES to be an effective tool for poverty reduction and alleviation, low-
income providers of ecosystem services and low-income groups dependent on ecosystem 
service, must have access to CRES programs, be capable of supplying sustainable flow of 
services, and be able to negotiate favorable terms of CRES agreements/contracts. Such 
contracts would ideally enhance the financial and social value of their resources; leverage 
positive land use changes, bundle activities providing complementary ecosystem services 
with other productive activities, and focus on generating co-benefits and reducing 
livelihood risks.  
 
To evaluate which CRES market segments will have the potential to generate such 
outcomes at local, national and international scales, and understanding how to shape 
such outcomes, requires answers to a number of research questions. These can be 
categorized as relating to evolving patterns of economic ‘demand’ for ecosystem services, 
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of evolving ‘supply’, and of evolving market institutions for CRES (including 
streamlining of transaction costs and financing). 
 
5.1 Evolving Patterns of Economic Demand for Ecosystem Services 
 
1)  More in-depth analysis is needed of the potential for conservation finance from 
diverse sources, for key ecosystems and ecosystem services, over the next 20 
years. What proportion of this is likely to be derived from CRES? In what types 
of areas and for what resources will CRES be preferred as an ecosystem strategy 
rather than other forms of management or conservation financing? 
 
2)  How profitable will participation in CRES be for low-income rural land stewards? 
What level of prices can be expected to evolve over the next 20 years, in relation 
to other income sources? How large will be the premiums placed on eco-certified 
products? To what extent will the poor be able to participate in eco-certified 
product markets?  
 
3)  What will be the incentives for CRES to develop pro-poor business models? 
What social marketing can be done to encourage businesses and consumers to 
offset their ecological footprints? What are different types of buyers’ motivations 
to seek social co-benefits? Will urban demand for environmental services depend 
more on market forces or political processes? 
 
5.2 Evolving Patterns of Supply of Ecosystem Services 
 
1)  What is the scientific evidence on how resource management approaches affect  
hydrology, biodiversity and carbon sequestration in different ecosystem 
conditions?  
To what extent can ecosystem services be produced in mixed landscape mosaics, 
and 
thus be part of a portfolio of income generating and ecosystem health activities 
for rural communities? How can scientifically credible offsets for carbon through 
avoided deforestation be designed? How can we better define and measure the 
services being paid for? 
 
2)  How can targeting of the poor best be done in public and private sector CRES? 
Are precedents being set that enable or provide barriers to participation of the 
poor? 
 
3)  What are the potential income and benefit flows from production of ecosystem  
 services relative to products (esp. crops/livestock)? 
 
4)  How can countries monitor progress in achieving ecosystem goods and services? 
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5.3 Evolving Institutions for CRES Markets 
 
1)  For eco-certification, how can we fill gaps in the value chain for stewardship by 
the poor? 
 
2)  For private payments, what intermediation and aggregation of buyers and sellers 
can 
occur? To what extent can organizations of poor producers engage in these 
activities for themselves? What are the priority capacity building initiatives that 
should be funded? 
 
3)  What institutional arrangements can significantly reduce transaction costs for 
low- income communities to supply large-scale private and public buyers? How 
can demand from private sector buyers of ecosystem services be aggregated and 
intermediated in ways that facilitate transactions with low-income providers?  
 
4)  Through what mechanisms can we track and encourage dialogue on the positive 
and negative impacts of CRES on low-income communities, as CRES evolve? 
 
5)  What institutional options can be developed to finance low-income producers to 
undertake investments that will produce ecosystem services paid for upon 
delivery? 
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Table 1. Estimated Size of Payments for Biodiversity Services 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Ecosystem Market Matrix, version 19. Ecosystem Marketplace, 2006.  
 
Ecosystem Payment Types  Estimated Current Size of Payments 
Globally (US$ per annum) 
Estimated Current Size of 
Payments in Developing 
Countries  (US$ per annum) 
Regulatory-Driven Species Offsets 
(including US Conservation Banking) 
US$45 million in the US; Program just begun 
in Australia and possibly similar program in 
France, size unknown 
Unknown how many species 
offsets are driven by 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) regulation in 
developing countries 
Land Trusts, Conservation Easements 
(and expenditures by NGOs for 
conservation) 
US$6,000 million in US alone  Size and use of easements in 
developing countries unknown. 
Roughly US$2 billion/yr 
(McKinsey-WRI-TNC) 
Voluntary Biodiversity Offsets (offsets 
outside the regulatory framework) 
US$20 million for just offsets  Probably some 50% of global 
market 
Government Conservation Payments 
and Biodiversity Offsets 
US$3,000 million - just flora and fauna 
oriented programs (not including water and 
soil conservation) 
Costa Rica: over US$14 Million; 
Current global expenditures on 
protected areas are estimated at 
approximately US$6.5 billion per 
year  








Estimated Current Size of 
Payments Globally (US$ per 
annum) 
Estimated Current Size of Payments in 
Developing Countries  (US$ per annum) 
Compliant Water Quality 
Trading  
US$7 million  Size and volume in developing countries 
unknown, but likely minimal, due to 
requirements for legislative infrastructure 
and strict enforcement 
Voluntary Private Sector 
Watershed Management 
Payments 
US$5 million (many public PES are 
partially private - like Costa Rica 
~30% private funds by electric, also 
Ecuador, public utility revenues) 
Costa Rica ~30% private funds by electric, 
also Ecuador, public utility revenues. ESPH 
in Costa Rica operates independent of 
FONAFIFO and invests roughly US$45,000 
a year in protecting the watershed 
Government Mediated 
Watershed PES 
US$1,000 million (New York City 
~US$150 million, WRP US$240 
million, EQUIP estimate 50% for 
water-related ~US$500 million); 
Mexico program: US$18 million; 
Costa Rica program: US$5 million; 
China program: roughly US$4 billion 
per year 
Mexico program: US$18 million; Costa Rica 
program: US$5 million; China program: 
US$US 43 billion across 10 years (program 
apparently has lots of problems); South 




Source: Adapted from Ecosystem Market Matrix, version 19. Ecosystem Marketplace, 2006 
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Estimated Current Size of 
Payments Globally 
(US$ per annum) 
  
Estimated Current Size of 
Payments in Developing Countries 
(US$ per annum) 
Regulatory-Driven 
Carbon Forestry (e.g. 
Kyoto, LULUCF) 




US$15 million  Probably 80% in developing countries 
Compliant Carbon 
Trading 
US$1,000 million (just for project-
based reductions) 








US$155-185 million  NA 
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Table 4. Potential for CRES Market Sector to Benefit Poor Ecosystem Service Providers in Developing Countries in 20 Years 
  --------------------------------------------------------Buyer-------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Compensation for: 
Public sector  Private, under 
regulatory 
requirement 
Private, voluntary  




















Quantity/Flow  XX X  XX  X  x 
 
Water Quality   XX x  XX  X  X 
Biodiversity 
Conservation   XX X  XX  XX  XX 
Landscape Beauty 
or Recreation  XX 0  XX  X  x 
* These estimates are not predictions; rather they reflect the potential if political and economic actions to shape CRES to benefit the poor are largely 
successful. See Section 3 for a discussion of key factors influencing the development of pro-poor CRES markets and programs. 
 
XXX – Potentially millions of low-income providers could benefit    
XX    - Potentially hundreds of thousands of low-income providers could benefit 
X       - Fewer than 100,000 low-income providers likely to benefit 
x        - These markets segments likely to develop, but affecting small numbers of low-income providers 
0        - These market segments unlikely to develop
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